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An enduring risk communication question is whether dialogue
really changes what a corporation or government agency does. In other
words, is risk communication merely symbolic - a way of mollifying
stakeholders so such organizations need not change? Or, do
organizations respond with more than words? In a seminal presentation
about risk communication, William Ruckelshaus, then director of the
Environmental Protection Agency, championed "participatory
democracy" as means of resolving environmental dilemmas. 1
However, government agencies' and corporations' reactions to
stakeholders have ranged widely.2
I suggest that what happens inside an organization affects its
responsiveness to outside stakeholders. I propose a model using two
variables to explore aspects of differences in this responsiveness.
Examples from two case studies on chemical manufacturers' risk
communication are used to illustrate the use of the proposed model.
The model of organizational responsiveness is based, in part, on the
following two hypotheses: 1. Risk communication may be associated
with an organizational adaptation to threat in the external
environment; 3 and 2. the organizational links between risk
* This work was supported by the New Jersey Institute of Technology's Hazardous
Substances Management Reseach Center and an EPA STAR fellowship.
** Dr. Chess is Director, Center for Environmental Communication and Associate
Professor, Department of Human Ecology, Rutgers University. She holds a Ph.D.
(Environmental Sciences and Forestry) from the State University of New York. Email:
chess_ c@aesop. rutgers edu.
1 See William Ruckelshaus, Communicating About Risk, in Risk
Communication: Proceedings of the National Conference on Risk Communication
Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, (J. Clarence Davies, Vincent
Covello & Frederick Allen eds., 1987).
2 See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged:
Twenty Years of Process, 15 RiskAnal. 137 1995).
3 When the organization's discretion is less than the discretion of another
organization to control an activity, the activity is outside the organization's boundary.
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communication functions and risk management functions affect the
extent to which organizations are responsive to risk stakeholders.
1. Risk communication may be associated with an organizational
adaptation to threat in the external environment. Organizations seek
to maintain legitimacy (congruence between values implied by
organizational actions and norms of behavior in the larger society).4
Lessening of legitimacy puts pressure on organizations by reducing
access to resources. 5 For example, in the wake of Bhopal, chemical
manufacturers had difficulty siting facilities, expanding plants, and
routing trucks through neighborhoods. Also, chemical manufacturers
were faced with uncertainty, i.e., unpredictable changes in variables that
affected organizational decisionmaking. 6 Pfeffer and Salancik suggest
that such turbulence can be more unsettling to managers than loss of
resources from inability to predict the future and plan a response. 7
The proposed model of organizational responsiveness to
stakeholders suggests that risk communication may be used, in part, to
reduce organizations' perceptions of threat. Within this context, threat
is composed of the three variables described above: legitimacy, access to
resources, and uncertainty. I suggest that the greater the perceived
threat from risk stakeholders, the more motivated a company will be to
initiate risk communication to reduce the threat. While the threat
motivates the risk communication, it does not necessarily influence the
form of communication (e.g., media outreach, public meetings,
advisory committees, etc.) nor the extent that the risk communication
conforms to accepted practices. 8
Perception of threat is organizationally constructed, just as risk has
been conceptualized as socially constructed. Risk has been characterized
as resulting from beliefs and norms, not merely numbers representing
See Jeffrey Pfeffer & Gerald Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A
Resource Dependence Perspective (1978) (current thinking about the external
environment focuses on norms, roles, and expectations, as well as resources related to
production).
4 See, e.g., John Dowling & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizational Legitimacy: Social
Values and Organizational Behavior, Pac. Soc. Rev., at 122 (1975).
5 See Pfeffer & Salancik, supra note 3.
6 See Lorenzi et al., Perceived Environmental Uncertainty: An Individual or
Environmental Attribute, 7 J. Mgmt. 27 (1981).
7 See Pfeffer & Salancik, supra note 3.
8 See, e.g., National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (1989).
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illness and death. 9 Similarly, organizational environments are not
merely measurable, objective realities; they are socially constructed
through a process of attention and interpretation.1 0 In other words, an
organization's perception of its reality is shaped, in part, by what the
company chooses to notice. 1
2. The organizational links between risk communication functions
and risk management functions affect the extent to which
organizations are responsive to risk stakeholders. Perrow's seminal
work Normal Accidents12 examines the links among sub-units within
complex organizations that have the potential to cause catastrophe, such
as nuclear power plants and chemical manufacturing. According to
Perrow and the organizational theorists who have written extensively on
the subject tightly coupled systems are those in which there is no "slack
or buffer between two items." Loose coupling, according to analysis of
educational systems, 13 suggests that "anythings" are "tied together
either weakly or infrequently, or slowly or with minimal
interdependencies."
Coupling is used as a metaphor to conceptualize relationships within
an organization, but the metaphor is usually not operationalized in clear
or consistent terms, an "underspecification" which some theorists
suggest has advantages for exploratory research. 14 However, for
purposes of the model of organizational responsiveness, I adapted the
following indicators from previous analyses: a) rules, mechanisms for
compliance with rules, and feedback to improve compliance; 15 and b)
9 See, e.g., Sheldon Krimsky, The Role of Theory In Risk Studies, in Social
Theories of Risk (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds. 1992).
10 See Pfeffer & Salancik, supra note 3, at 13.
11 The question of whether this perception is the summation of perceptions of
individuals in the organization, the summation of perceptions of those who affect the
organization's decisions, or the organization as a whole, is a complex question beyond
the scope of this paper.
12 See Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies
(1984).
13 See Karl Weick, Educational Organizations As Loosely Coupled Systems, 5
Admin. Sci. Q. 1 (1976).
14 See Douglas. J. Orton & Karl Weick, Loosely Coupled Systems: A
Reconceptualization, 15 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 203 (1990).
15 See Karl Weick, Administering Education in Loosely Coupled Schools, Phi
Delta Kappan 673-676 (June 1982).
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frequent communication for coordination; and c) constraint of one
function by another.
If the ties between risk communication (RC) and risk management
(RM) are loose, these functions are largely severable from each other.
Tighter coupling is indicated by rules that link RC and RM, close
coordination of RC and RM activities, and the limitation of one
function by the other. Thus, I look for structures or processes that
suggest RC functions are constrained by RM or vice versa. In addition,
if there is a group of senior managers who wield significant power, the
so-called "dominant coalition," a function unrepresented in this
coalition would be considered less important than functions that are. 16
The model proposes that loose coupling between risk
communication and risk management reduces the likelihood that a
company will closely tie what it says to what it does. 17 For example, if
those responsible for risk communication (RC) and those who make
decisions regarding risk management (RM) seldom interact and are
functionally distant, then the company will be less responsive to risk
stakeholders. While the communication between the stakeholders and
the company may be two-way, the organizational structure makes it less
likely that what stakeholders say will reach those with the power to
make operational decisions. I apply these hypotheses to empirical
research on two cases of chemical companies' risk communication. 18
Overview of Empirical Research
Sybron Chemicals
The first case involves Sybron Chemicals, a small specialty chemical
manufacturer in semi-rural New Jersey that raised a stink in 1988 (in
more ways than one) when it released an odoriferous chemical at 2
16 See James Dozier & Larissa Grunig, The Organization of the Public Relations
Function, in Excellence in Public Relations and Communication Management (J. E.
Grunig et al., eds. 1992).
17 Id. Leading public relations theorists call for an analogous two-way, symmetrical
communication. Their normative theory, which is based on open-systems theory and
analysis of power relationships, prescribes strong, centralized public relations units.
Comparing the proposed model to the normative theory of public relations is beyond
the scope of this paper, which discusses two cases without formal public relations,
public information, or related units.
18 For an explanation of research mehods see Chess et al., The Organizational
Links Between Risk Communication and Risk Management: The Case of Sybron
Chemicals, 12 RiskAnal. 431 (1992).
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A.M., leading to the evacuation of 60 people. The resulting outcry led
Sybron to begin a crash course in risk communication, which included
the development of a sophisticated telecommunications system.1 9
This telecommunications system known as the Prompt Inquiry
Notification System (PINS) enables the company to notify plant
neighbors in the event of an emergency. On a routine basis, callers can
contact the plant through the PINS system to alert the shift supervisor
to suspect odors and/or to ask questions. 20
The Consortium
The second case known as the Consortium, involves more than 80
chemical companies in a densely industrialized county of the U.S.
These companies banded together to support their efforts to
communicate information required under the federal right to know law
(e.g. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know). 2 1 One
plant manager also developed a telecommunications system for use by
his site (Plant C) and other companies in the area. This
telecommunications system, called the Careline, enables companies
with operational problems, or indicators that might be perceived as
problems (e.g., unusual flares), to place a message on the system for
concerned callers, who can contact a central number rather than track
down the phone numbers of the plants that might be involved.
Operators from plant C also served as liaisons between callers with
questions not answered by the message on the Careline and any
companies in the area. Plant C operators relayed callers' questions and




21 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 11048.
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The Model of Organizational Responsiveness
I use illustrations from these cases to explain the model below.
High Symbolic Change
Change
Sybron CAC Sybron PINS
TA. Companies'
Use of Careline Site C Use
0of Careline
TA. Laggards




When perceptions of external threat are low, and coupling between
RC and RM is loose, organizations have little reason to adapt behavior,
and organizational structure does not facilitate adaptation. The aite is
unlikely to change in responsiveness to outside stakeholders. This
quadrant typifies what industry practitioners have expressed to me as
"Let sleeping dogs lie." Laggard companies in the locale of the
Consortium seemed to typify this approach. These companies did not
use the Careline for placing messages.
Similarly, Sybron's vice president for human relations described the
plant's feelings toward plant neighbors as "benign neglect," prior to the
1988 release. Managers acknowledged that until the plant was
threatened they paid little attention to the community. When
perceptions of organizational threat are high and coupling between RC
and RM is tight, organization have both reasons and structural
capability to adapt. The site is likely to respond with changes in RM
practices.
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At Sybron, managers perceived a major crisis arising from the
incidents of 1988. A busload of protestors travelled to Washington,
D.C. and, as a result, the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection investigated. Subsequently, there were calls for a plant shut
down. As the CEO stated, the company "didn't have a lot of choice"
about plunging into RC after the release. In the words of the plant
manager, the plant developed its RC program "because we want to stay
here. We know that to stay here we have to not be an enemy to our
neighbors, but [we have] to be a participant with our neighbors so we
are all in this together." Sybron's goal of reducing through the PINS
plant neighbors' fears can be seen as an attempt to reduce threat by
building stability, legitimacy, and access to resources.
On a routine basis Sybron's shift supervisors were directly
responsible for communicating with callers to the PINS, tracking
potential problems to the source, eliminating these problems, and then
contacting the callers who reported the concerns. Thus, RC and RM
were handled by the same person. RC and RM functions constrained
each other. For example, RC functions dictated RM action (calls to
PINS prompted RM surveillance and correction of problems, such as
odoriferous releases, which affected quality of life, if not health). RM
also dictated RC functions (When a problem was discovered, the shift
supervisor was required to change the message on the PINS.) In
addition, the tightness of RM and RC was reinforced with standard
operating procedures which required shift supervisors to handle both
PINS and operational duties, as well as to report all such uses of the
PINS. Finally, the dominant coalition of the plant (including one vice
president, the director of regulatory affairs, and the plant manager)
coordinated both RC and RM activities.
Similarly, interviewees of leading companies in the Consortium
pointed to economic survival as a reason for banding together with
other companies to develop RC programs. As one manager noted,
senior managers "are actually convinced and I am too that we aren't
going to survive without the community." While the companies seemed
to an outsider to dominate the economic life of the area, plant C's
former manager of public affairs noted threats to industry's dominance:
"We heard the drumbeats of Bhopal." Those beats got louder as time
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approached for release of toxics information under the federal right to
know law and increased as a result of several major incidents that led to
worker deaths.
In addition, several of the plants that served as innovators in the
Consortium were expected by their corporate headquarters to take
leadership roles in RC. For example, one manager made it clear that
advancement was tied to RC activities. Thus, threat was not due to
immediate pressure such as found at Sybron but was nonetheless based
on concerns about legitimacy that led to the development of RC
programs.
While the structural links between RC and RM were not as tight as
at Sybron Chemicals, closer links between RC and RM were sometimes
forged by the Careline. The lead company plant C, had standard
operating procedures, not dissimilar to Sybron's, to closely link
operational problems with communication with callers. When the
organizational perception of threat is high and the coupling between
RC and RM is loose, there may be organizational reason to adapt, but
the organizational structure does not facilitate adaptation. The site is
likely to evidence symbolic action to influence perceptions of
stakeholders.
When the site perceives threat, but RC and RM are loosely coupled,
RC cannot easily and routinely influence activities of RM. For example,
if the RC function does not provide information to the RM function
about the nature of and frequency of complaints, the RM function will
not have sufficient information to make appropriate adjustments. The
site response is likely to be symbolic: talking about risks rather than
taking action to reduce risks (whether to health or to quality of life).
Symbolic action to influence outside stakeholders is a strategy that
seeks to change the external environment rather than to adapt through
organizational change. 2 2 In other words under the conditions of
perceived threat and loose coupling, the site will be more likely to
attempt to modify stakeholders' perceptions - rather than to attempt
to change the site's own behavior.
For example, many of the Consortium activities were devoted to
education to influence perceptions of stakeholders (symbolic action),
rather than to agreement of companies to change practices. Thus,
22 See Dowling & Pfeffer, supra note 4.
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community fairs, a Consortium brochure and other activities were the
norm. Companies could receive the benefits of collaborative efforts,
such as having their name on a brochure espousing safety, without
having to change practices.
In addition, companies could subscribe to the Careline and use it to
place messages, but sites were not required to link this communication
to improving risk management. When contacted by operators of the
Careline with callers' questions about a perceived malfunction, plants
could decline to track potential problems. The functioning of the
Careline exemplifies loose coupling: Plant C staff could not constrain
the actions of subscribing companies, which had total discretion to
behave as they wished - in contrast to shift supervisors for Sybron's
PINS or operators of Plant C who had rules that required linking of
RC and RM.
However, I found that coupling of RC and RM could vary with
activity at Sybron. While the PINS was directly linked with RM, and
the standard operating procedures maintained the tight coupling, such
standardization was not easy with the citizen advisory committee,
which dealt with multiple issues. Managers who attended the advisory
committee meetings did not follow decision rules about how to
respond to requests, including those related to RM, and there was no
readily apparent pattern of constraint between RC and RM through
standard operating procedures. This flexibility is also compatible with
the risk literature that suggests those conducting RC need latitude; 23
the looser coupling of RC and RM related to the advisory committee
made it easier for Sybron managers to deal creatively (or not at all) with
non-routine and unpredictable requests. There was some evidence that
this loose coupling is associated with more attempts to influence
members than change company practices. For example, if Sybron's
proposal for a lucrative co-generation plant were opposed, the CEO
said the plant "would do our best to convince them [members of the
CAC]" (although the VP for manufacturing was more equivocal, "If
they understood the risk issues and were horribly against it, I don't
know that we would continue the project.")
23 See, e.g., National Research Council, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions
in a Democratic Society (P. Stern & H.V. Fineberg eds. 1996); Dozier & Grunig,
supra note 16.
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I propose that the final quadrant, of low threat and tight coupling,
would include the organizational capability to respond but no reason to
do so. I hypothesize such a situation could occur when a company no
longer saw a reason to be responsive to stakeholders but still had
structures in place that would enable it to change if a threat arose. I saw
little evidence of this pattern, but the relationship between this quadrant
and these corporate case studies raises interesting and complex issues
tied to organizational learning, which is beyond the scope of this article.
Discussion
Because this model of organizational responsiveness was generated
from a limited set of case studies, it is proposed primarily as an
additional lens for studying risk communication and not as a
deterministic typology. For example, although these case studies
suggest that risk communication may evolve from crises of legitimacy,
this is only sometimes so. Later adoptors of innovation may conform to
convention and "enhance their legitimacy, to demonstrate that they are
at least trying."2 4 However, unless tight coupling of RC and RM
becomes an industry norm, such mimetic behavior is more likely to
lead to symbolic action. Thus, a PINS might be disconnected from
operations and focus more on disseminating information than
responding to callers (analogous to the use of the Careline by some
companies).
The model may suggest other elements for research on democratic
processes. When studying agency practice, it may be useful to consider
the impetus for risk communication and the relationship of RC to
programmatic decisionmaking. As with these corporate cases, an agency
(or division within an agency) that perceives a loss of legitimacy,
decreased stability, and/or reduced access to resources, might be likely
to initiate a risk communication effort. However, if the functions of
programmatic decisionmaking and risk communication are distinct
(loosely coupled), the agency or its divisions might be less likely to
respond to stakeholders' concerns with organizational change. When
many managers do not have communication responsibility, and
24 Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in The New
Institutionalism in OrganizationalAnalysis (W. W. Powell & P. DiMaggio eds.1991).
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communication specialists do not have programmatic authority, I
hypothesize that forms of "participatory democracy" would likely be
symbolic - mollifying stakeholders rather than responding to their
concerns.
Public relations theorists have stressed the need for centralized
public relations units staffed with experienced practitioners. 2 5 The
model described here suggests that it may also be useful to examine the
structural relationship of these units to programmatic functions. For
example, as with Sybron, an agency that requires division managers to
communicate may respond differently to stakeholders than one with a
centralized communications unit that is isolated from programmatic
decisions. Initial interviews in one environmental protection agency
found divisions relatively isolated from the agency's central
communications unit but division managers interacted directly with
stakeholders. An important next step is to study these divisions'
responses to stakeholders: Is change symbolic or organizational?
The benefit of theory is not merely to explain the world but to help
researchers to see: "If believing affects seeing, and if theories are
significant beliefs that affect what we see, then theories should be
adopted more to maximize what we will see than to summarize what
we have already seen."2 6 This model of stakeholder responsibility is
not proposed as comprehensive; other organizational factors, such as
organizational learning, culture, and leadership may be associated with
responsiveness to stakeholders, in specific, and participatory processes,
in general. But I propose the model in hopes of encouraging greater use
of an organizational lens to understand the relationship between
participatory processes and substantive outcomes.
25 See Dozier & Grunig, supra note 16.
26 Karl Weick, Theorizing About Organizational Communication, in Handbook of
Organizational Communication, (Frederic Jablin et al., eds. 1989).
10 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 257 [Summer 1999]

